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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
 No. 13-2638 
___________ 
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                                         Appellant 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
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D.C. Criminal No. 1-12-cr-00009-004 
(Honorable Christopher C. Conner) 
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_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
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 Defendant Jamael Stubbs was the getaway driver for an armed bank robbery. He 
was indicted in the Middle District of Pennsylvania and, through vicarious liability, was 
convicted of one count of armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and 
(d), and one count of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Stubbs appeals his § 924(c) conviction and sentence arguing 
that (1) there was insufficient evidence to convict him of brandishing a firearm, and  
(2) the imposition of a higher mandatory sentence for brandishing a firearm violates the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), 
because his indictment only charged him with using and carrying a firearm. Because 
there was sufficient evidence to convict him of brandishing a firearm and the seven-year 
sentence did not constitute reversible plain error, we will affirm.1 
I. 
 On August 29, 2012, a grand jury in the Middle District of Pennsylvania returned 
a twelve-count indictment charging Stubbs with two counts of armed bank robbery in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), and two counts of using and carrying a firearm 
during the robberies in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).2 He was charged along 
with three co-defendants: Tristan Green, Nijul Alexander, and Jami Shabazz. Alexander 
and Shabazz pled guilty and testified for the prosecution. 
According to Alexander’s testimony, Stubbs was intimately involved in the 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
2 The charges related to two alleged bank robberies that took place in November and December 
of 2007. The government withdrew the charges relating to the December robbery, and Stubbs 
proceeded to trial only on the offenses arising out of the November robbery. 
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planning and execution of the November 2007 robbery. Stubbs, Green, and Alexander 
planned the logistics in multiple discussions and rehearsed how the robbery would take 
place. The defendants had planned that Stubbs would drive Green and Alexander to the 
bank and, after the robbery, would drive Green and Alexander to another vehicle driven 
by Shabazz, where the two gunmen would switch cars to avoid police detection.  
As rehearsed and scheduled, Stubbs drove Green and Alexander to the bank on the 
day of the robbery and remained in the vehicle while the two robbed the bank at 
gunpoint. According to photographs taken from bank video, bank personnel testimony, 
and co-conspirator admission, Green and Alexander pointed their guns at various bank 
personnel during the robbery. After completing the robbery, Green, Alexander, and 
Stubbs escaped in Stubbs’s car with backpacks filled with stolen money. As they fled, 
dye packets contained among the stolen cash exploded. Green and Alexander threw the 
backpacks containing the stained money and Alexander’s gun out of Stubbs’s car. Police 
later identified those backpacks as ones purchased by Green and Stubbs a few days 
before the robbery at a nearby Walmart. Stubbs dropped off Green and Alexander at 
Shabazz’s car, and the four defendants reconvened at Stubbs’s house to clean the dye 
from his car. 
At the close of the government’s case, Stubbs moved for a judgment of acquittal 
on the armed bank robbery and firearm counts. The District Court denied the motion, 
concluding “there is sufficient evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could 
reach a verdict of guilty.” App. 862. The jury found Stubbs guilty on both counts. 
Although the indictment charged Stubbs with “carry[ing] and us[ing] a firearm during . . . 
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a crime of violence . . . in violation of . . . Section 924(c)(1)(A),” App. 41, the jury found 
that “Stubbs or a coconspirator did knowingly . . . brandish a firearm during . . . a crime 
of violence,” App. 59 (emphasis added). Stubbs was sentenced to a prison term of 154 
months—70 months for armed robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), plus 84 
months (seven-year) statutory minimum for brandishing a firearm during a crime of 
violence under § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).3 Stubbs filed a timely notice of appeal challenging his 
conviction and sentence for the § 924(c) charge. Stubbs does not challenge his conviction 
for armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d). 
II. 
 Stubbs advances two arguments on appeal, both concerning his § 924(c) 
conviction for brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence: (1) that there was 
insufficient evidence to convict him of brandishing a firearm under either a Pinkerton co-
conspirator theory or an aiding and abetting theory of liability, and (2) that the imposition 
of a mandatory seven-year sentence for brandishing a firearm under § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) 
violates Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), because Stubbs’s indictment 
only charged him with “carry[ing] and us[ing] a firearm,” but not with the separate 
“brandishing” element. 
A. 
 Stubbs first challenges the District Court’s denial of his motion for a judgment of 
acquittal on the § 924(c) count. Stubbs argues the government did not produce sufficient 
                                              
3 The crime charged in the indictment, using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, 
carries a five-year mandatory minimum. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). 
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evidence to convict him under either theory of liability charged—Pinkerton co-
conspirator liability or aiding and abetting liability. 
 We exercise plenary review over the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a 
criminal conviction. United States v. Moyer, 674 F.3d 192, 206 (3d Cir. 2012). “[T]he 
critical inquiry . . . is whether . . . any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 
726 F.3d 418, 424-25 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 
307, 318-19 (1979)). We accord deference to the jury’s verdict by viewing “the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the Government” and drawing “all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the jury verdict.” Moyer, 674 F.3d at 206 (quoting United States v. Riley, 621 
F.3d 312, 329 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
 The jury found Stubbs guilty of brandishing a firearm during commission of a 
violent crime. Although Stubbs did not personally brandish a firearm during the bank 
robbery, he can be vicariously liable for the offense under either a Pinkerton co-
conspirator theory or an aiding and abetting theory of liability. In Pinkerton v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), “the Supreme Court held that the criminal act of one 
conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy is attributable to the other[ ] [conspirators] 
for the purpose of holding them responsible for the substantive offense.” United States v. 
Lopez, 271 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
A defendant is liable for substantive offenses committed by co-conspirators under a 
Pinkerton theory if (1) the defendant is a party to a criminal conspiracy, (2) one or more 
co-conspirators committed the substantive offense in furtherance of the conspiracy, and 
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(3) commission of the substantive offense was reasonably foreseeable. United States v. 
Ramos, 147 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 Stubbs only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the first prong of 
Pinkerton, arguing that there was insufficient evidence that he entered into a conspiracy 
to commit an armed bank robbery.4 But Stubbs’s argument is unavailing. The first prong 
of Pinkerton requires only that a defendant enter into an unlawful conspiracy. See, e.g., 
Ramos, 147 F.3d at 286; United States v. Casiano, 113 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 1997). All 
that the first prong of Pinkerton requires for Stubbs’s § 924(c) brandishing count is that 
the jury find the defendant joined a criminal conspiracy. Accordingly, the first prong of 
Pinkerton liability is satisfied if Stubbs entered into an agreement to rob a bank.5 
 There was ample evidence in the record for a rational juror to find beyond a 
                                              
4 Stubbs does not challenge the sufficiency of the government’s evidence that a co-conspirator 
brandished a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy or that brandishing a firearm during the 
robbery was reasonably foreseeable.  
 
5 Stubbs points to one sentence of the district court’s jury instructions to argue that the 
government had the higher burden of proving that he knowingly and voluntarily entered into a 
conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery with full knowledge that guns would be used. 
Appellant Br. 24. But reading the jury instructions as a whole, the district court adequately 
instructed the jury on the first prong of Pinkerton liability. See App. 964 (“What the government 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that two or more persons in some way or manner 
arrived at some type of an agreement, mutual understanding, or meeting of the minds to try to 
accomplish a common and unlawful objective.” (emphasis added)); id. at 962-63 (“The 
government does not have to prove that . . . Stubbs specifically agreed or knew that these 
offenses would be committed. However, the government must prove that the offenses were 
reasonably foreseeable to . . . Stubbs as a member of the conspiracy and within the scope of the 
agreement . . . .”); id. at 963-64 (“The government does not have to prove . . . that all members of 
the conspiracy . . . agreed to all the details or agreed to what the means were by which the 
objectives would be accomplished.”); id. at 965 (“The government does not have [to] prove that 
the alleged conspirators agreed to commit all of the crimes. The government, however, must 
prove that they agreed to commit at least one of the object[ive] crimes . . . .”); id. at 931 (“You 
are not to single out any one instruction alone as stating the law, but must consider the 
instructions as a whole in reaching your decisions.”). 
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reasonable doubt that Stubbs joined a conspiracy to rob a bank with Green and 
Alexander. According to Alexander’s testimony, Stubbs was intimately involved in the 
planning and execution of the November robbery. Stubbs, Green, and Alexander planned 
the logistics of the robbery in multiple discussions, and they rehearsed the robbery. 
Furthermore, there was ample evidence that the robbery actually took place and that 
Stubbs participated in the commission of the crime as rehearsed. In sum, there was 
sufficient evidence that Stubbs entered into a criminal conspiracy with Green and 
Alexander and the evidence of Stubbs’s role in the planning and execution of the robbery 
was sufficient for a rational juror to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, Stubbs vicariously 
liable for a violation of § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) under a Pinkerton co-conspirator theory.6 
B. 
 Stubbs also argues the imposition of a mandatory seven-year sentence for 
brandishing a firearm under § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) violates Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. 
Ct. 2151 (2013), because Stubbs’s indictment charged him with carrying and using a 
firearm but not with the separate element of brandishing a firearm. Accordingly, we must 
                                              
6 Stubbs also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction under an aiding and 
abetting theory. In a case decided during the pendency of this appeal, the Supreme Court 
clarified the standard for showing that a defendant aided and abetted a § 924(c) offense. See 
Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014). The Court in Rosemond held that convicting 
a defendant for a § 924(c) offense under an aiding and abetting theory requires the government to 
prove that “the defendant actively participated in the underlying . . . violent crime with advance 
knowledge that a confederate would use or carry a gun during the crime’s commission.” Id. at 
1243 (emphasis added). The defendant must have advance knowledge of the use of a firearm so 
that he or she has the opportunity “to make the relevant legal (and indeed moral) choice” to join 
the criminal venture or “to quit the crime.” Id. at 1249. Since we find the evidence sufficient to 
convict Stubbs under a Pinkerton theory of vicarious liability, we need not decide whether there 
was sufficient evidence of Stubbs’s advance knowledge under Rosemond. 
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address (1) whether the “brandishing” element of § 924(c) must be charged in an 
indictment, and, if so, (2) whether its omission constitutes reversible plain error.  
1. 
 A person who uses or carries a firearm during a crime of violence faces a 
consecutive sentence of at least five years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). A 
person who brandishes a firearm during a crime of violence faces a consecutive sentence 
of at least seven years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Stubbs’s indictment 
charged him with “carry[ing] and us[ing] a firearm during . . . a crime of violence . . . in 
violation of  . . . Section 924(c)(1)(A).” App. 41. But the jury convicted Stubbs of 
“brandishing” a firearm during the armed robbery, which carries a higher mandatory 
sentence under § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). App. 59. The additional “brandishing” element 
increased his mandatory minimum sentence from five years to seven years. 
 Less than a month after Stubbs was sentenced, the Supreme Court decided Alleyne 
v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013). In an extension of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466 (2000), which held that—under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution—any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond a statutory 
maximum constitutes an element of a crime that must be charged in the indictment and 
proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, Alleyne held that any fact which increases 
a mandatory minimum sentence also constitutes an element of a crime. Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. 
at 2155. The Court in Alleyne determined that the “brandishing” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c)(1)(A)(ii)—the same element at issue here—constitutes an element of a separate, 
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aggravated § 924(c) offense that must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.7 Id. 
at 2163.  
 The government contends that the Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne, unlike in 
Apprendi, did not explicitly say that the element must also be charged in the indictment 
and only requires that brandishing be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
government therefore argues that Stubbs’s sentence does not run afoul of Alleyne because 
the jury in Stubbs’s case found brandishing beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. 
  To adequately address the government’s argument, we briefly recite the 
jurisprudence’s evolution. In Jones v. United States, the Supreme Court noted that “under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees 
of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the 
maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” 526 U.S. 227, 243, n.6 (1999). One year later, the 
Court confirmed this constitutional view expressed in Jones, holding that the Constitution 
imposes those requirements in a case involving a state statute. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 
476; see also United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 627 (2002) (“In [Apprendi], we held 
that . . . any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In federal 
prosecutions, such facts must also be charged in the indictment.” (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted)). The Apprendi Court reasoned that “[i]f a defendant faces 
                                              
7 In so doing, Alleyne overruled United States v. Harris, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), which held that 
“brandishing” under § 924(c) was a sentencing factor that did not need to be alleged in the 
indictment, submitted to the jury, or proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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punishment beyond that provided by statute when an offense is committed under certain 
circumstances but not others, it is obvious that both the loss of liberty and the stigma 
attaching to the offense are heightened; it necessarily follows that the defendant should 
not—at the moment the State is put to proof of those circumstances—be deprived of 
protections that have, until that point, unquestionably attached.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 
484.  
 In Alleyne, the Court applied the constitutional requirements announced in 
Apprendi to facts that increase a statutory minimum sentence. The Alleyne Court held that 
“the principle applied in Apprendi applies with equal force to facts increasing the 
mandatory minimum.” Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2160; see also id. at 2163 (“[T]here is no 
basis in principle or logic to distinguish facts that raise the maximum from those that 
increase the minimum.”). Thus, the constitutional requirements that apply to facts that 
increase a statutory maximum apply to facts that increase a statutory minimum. The 
Alleyne Court concluded 
The District Court imposed the 7-year mandatory minimum sentence based 
on its finding by a preponderance of evidence that the firearm was 
“brandished.” Because the finding of brandishing increased the penalty to 
which the defendant was subjected, it was an element, which had to be 
found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge, rather than the 
jury, found brandishing, thus violating petitioner’s Sixth Amendment 
rights. 
 
Id. at 2163-64. The Court expressly relied on the fact that the brandishing element was 
not submitted to the jury in overturning Alleyne’s sentence. That the Court did not hold 
in the alternative that the brandishing element was also improperly omitted from the 
indictment does not mean—as the government argues here—that only some of the 
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constitutional requirements of Apprendi apply to facts that increase a mandatory 
minimum. Rather, because “the principle applied in Apprendi applies with equal force to 
facts increasing the mandatory minimum,” Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2160, the fact of 
brandishing is an element of the crime that “must be charged in an indictment,” Apprendi, 
530 U.S. at 476. In other words, if the failure of a federal indictment to charge an element 
that increased a statutory maximum constitutes an Apprendi error, see Cotton, 535 U.S. at 
627, then the failure of a federal indictment to charge an element that increased the 
statutory minimum constitutes an Alleyne error. Here, the omission of “brandishing”—an 
element of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) that increases the statutory minimum—from 
Stubbs’s indictment is an error in light of Alleyne.  
2. 
 Because the omission of the brandishing element from the indictment was not 
challenged before the district court, we review Stubbs’s sentence for “plain error” under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631. A reversible 
plain error requires: (1) “an error” (2) “that is plain,” (3) “that affect[s] substantial 
rights,” and (4) that “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). Although Alleyne was decided after Stubbs was 
sentenced, we consider whether an error was plain at the time of appellate review. See 
Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1127 (2013). 
 In United States v. Cotton, the Supreme Court faced a question similar to the one 
we face here. 535 U.S. at 625. A federal indictment charged Cotton with conspiracy to 
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distribute a “detectable amount” of cocaine, but Cotton was convicted of and sentenced 
for conspiracy to distribute “at least 50 grams of cocaine base.” Id. at 628. The quantity 
element raised the statutory maximum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). Because 
Apprendi was decided after Cotton was sentenced but during his direct appeal, the Court 
in Cotton had to decide whether an indictment’s omission of an element that increased a 
statutory maximum sentence constituted reversible plain error. Id. at 627. The Court held 
that although the omission of the element from the indictment was an error, it “did not 
seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings” 
because of the “overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence” that Cotton’s crime 
involved at least 50 grams of cocaine base. Id. at 632-34 (“The evidence that the 
conspiracy involved at least 50 grams of cocaine base was overwhelming and essentially 
uncontroverted. . . . Surely the grand jury, having found that the conspiracy existed, 
would have also found that the conspiracy involved at least 50 grams of cocaine base.”). 
 Likewise, the omission of “brandishing” from Stubbs’s indictment was an error, 
but not one that “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings” because the evidence that at least one of Stubbs’s co-conspirators 
brandished a firearm during the bank robbery was “overwhelming and uncontroverted.” 
Cotton, 535 U.S. at 633-34. Photographs taken during the robbery from the bank’s 
surveillance video show Stubbs’s co-conspirators pointing guns at bank employees. One 
of Stubbs’s co-conspirators testified that he brandished a gun during the bank robbery. 
And several bank personnel testified at trial that firearms were pointed at them during the 
robbery. Moreover, there was no evidence challenging or undermining the fact that 
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firearms were brandished during the bank robbery. Based on this evidence, the grand 
jury, having found that the conspiracy existed, would have also found that the crime 
involved brandishing firearms. Because of the “overwhelming and uncontroverted” 
evidence of brandishing a firearm, the Alleyne error here “did not seriously affect the 
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 632-33. 
Accordingly, Stubbs’s sentence for brandishing a firearm under § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) does 
not constitute reversible plain error. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Stubbs’s conviction and sentence. 
